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Valuable as they are, conventional economic models have not succeeded in 
explaining the great differences in economic performance in different coun­
tries or historical periods. The “old” growth theory is called into question by 
the absence of the convergence in per-capita income levels across the globe 
that it leads one to expect. The “new” growth theory readily accommodates 
continuing differences in per-capita incomes across countries but does not yet 
provide much insight into why the particular countries that became rich were 
the ones that grew. Nor does it explain why a few poor countries have led the 
world in economic growth at the same time that the poor countries as a whole 
have not been catching up.
In a book, The Rise and Decline of Nations'*-, some article-length publica­
tions that foreshadowed it, and some subsequent papers and publications that 
focused on Eastern Europe and on the Third World3, I presented a theory that 
combines the insights of familiar neoclassical economic models with a model 
of collective choice. The model of collective choice enables the theory to com­
prehend certain aspects of political and organizational life. The theory suc­
ceeds in explaining the most dramatic and puzzling variations in economic per­
formance across countries.
1 lam  grateful to the US Agency for International Development for support of my research 
through the Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) at the Uni­
versity of Maryland. This support has facilitated my development of the general theory 
used here and particularly its application to the formerly communist countries and the 
Third World. I have also benefitted from a travel grant from the Thyssen Stiftung and 
from criticisms by Christopher Bartlett, Carol Kaplan, Nicholas Crafts, Lars Jonung, and 
R.C.O. Matthews.
2 New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982.
3 ‘T he Devolution of Centrally Planned Economies”, (with Peter Murrell) initially pre­
sented in tentative form to various audiences in the mid- and late-1980’s and published in 
the Journal o f Comparative Economics 15, 239-265 (1991)., ‘T he Logic o f Collective 
Action in Soviet-type Societies”, Journal of Soviet Nationalities, Vol. I, No. 2, Summer 
1990, pp. 8-33., “The Exploitation and Subsidization of Agriculture in the Developing 
and Developed Countries”, in Agriculture in a Turbulent World Economy: Proceedings of 
the Nineteenth International Conference of Agricultural Economists, held at Malaga, 
Spain August 26 -September 4, 1985, Edited by Allen Maunder and U lf Renborg 
(Brookfield, Vermont: Gower Publishing Company, 1986, pp. 49-59); “The Hidden 
Path to Economic Development”, in Christopher Clague and Gordon Rausser, The 





























































































The present essay will differ from the aforementioned book and articles in 
two ways.
First, this essay will attempt to show how the same fundamental forces that 
influence economic performance everywhere show up in very different forms 
in countries with different initial conditions. Even when one considers only the 
related and similar societies of Western Europe, the institutional and historical 
differences across countries not only have a significant independent effect on 
outcomes, but they also make the same fundamental forces take on a totally 
different appearance. Just as a change in temperature can turn water into ice 
or steam, so international differences in institutions can make a single, general 
force operating in different countries appear to be a variety of unrelated phe­
nomena. This essay will show that some apparently unrelated developments in 
Europe are, in fact, manifestations of the same process.
Second, this essay will focus only on economic growth since Rise and De­
cline was written. Any theory should be able to explain data beyond the data 
from which it was derived. Obviously, I could not have known, when writing 
the book, about developments that occurred after the book was published. 
Thus the theory could not possibly have been adjusted to take account of the 
developments that are the focus of the present essay.
Since my discussion will not be comprehensible unless the reader has some 
knowledge of the theory developed in prior works, Section I outlines some of 
the ideas from prior publications that will be used and tested in this essay. 
Readers who know both Rise and Decline and my subsequent papers on the 
communist and post-communist societies can skiD this section.
I. A Recapitulation of the Theory
The theory begins with collective action -  concerted efforts to lobby the 
government or to combine in the marketplace to influence prices and wages. 
Such action occurs through professional associations, labor unions, farm or­
ganizations, trade associations, and oligopolistic collusions of firms in concen­
trated industries.
The benefits of the governmental favors and the monopolistic or monopson- 




























































































ual in some group or category. For example, a tariff or tax loophole favors 
every firm in some industry or group, and cartelization raises the price or 
wage for every seller of a good. It follows that any sacrifice an individual 
makes to support a lobby or cartel for his group will benefit others as much as 
himself. A group with a common interest will be able to overcome this collec­
tive good problem only if it has the advantage of small numbers or is blessed 
with access to “selective incentives”.
The advantage of small numbers is clearest in a concentrated industry con­
taining only a few large firms. If there are two firms of the same size in an 
industry, each firm will obtain half of the benefit of any action in the interest 
of the group. Even though each firm must bear the whole cost of whatever it 
does for this group of two firms, it’s large share of the benefit will often be 
sufficient to give it an incentive for some unilateral action in the interest of the 
group. If there are, by contrast, a million individuals in a group with a com­
mon interest, a representative individual in the group will receive only a mil­
lionth of the benefits of any action he or she takes in the interest of the group. 
Eachjndividual will still have to bear the whole cost of whatever he or she 
does in the interest of the group. As these examples make obvious, the incen­
tive to act in the interest of the group must be less in large than in small 
groups, and in really large groups the incentive for an individual to engage in 
spontaneous collective action is vanishingly small.
When a large number of people share a common interest, they will be able 
to act collectively to serve this interest only if they have selective incentives. A 
selective incentive is a reward or punishment that, unlike the benefits of the 
collective good itself, selectively applies to individuals according to whether 
they do or do not contribute to the provision of the collective good, and there­
fore gives the individuals an incentive to act in the group interest. Probably 
the best known selective incentives are the closed shop, the union shop, and the 
coercive picket line -  those who do not share the costs of the collective action 
are threatened with loss of a job or are subject to social or physical intimida­
tion. Though the selective incentives used by other kinds of large organizations 
for collective action are usually less conspicuous, they are no less important4.
4 The logic of the foregoing argument is demonstrated in The Logic of Collective Action 
(Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1965). The findings of much of the best sub­
sequent literature on the topic are cited in Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1982) and in Todd Sandler Collective Action (Ann Arbor: U. 




























































































Since collective action is difficult and problematical, it usually takes quite 
some time before a group can engage in collective action, even when it has 
small numbers or the opportunity to devise selective incentives. The bargain­
ing that is required for those in small groups to organize or collude with full 
effectiveness often takes a while. Organizing large groups is incomparably 
more difficult and time consuming. It is only in the fullness of time that many 
groups will have had the able leadership and the favorable circumstances 
needed to organize for collective action.
The Incentives Facing Organizations for Collective Action
What difference does it make for the prosperity of a society how many 
groups, and what kinds of groups, are organized for collective action? The an­
swer is evident when we look at the incentives that organizations for collective 
action face.
The constituents of any organization that represents only a narrow segment 
of the society will virtually always be better off if the organization shifts the 
distribution of income in the society in their favor. An organization for col­
lective action can shift the distribution of income in the society through lobby­
ing for special-interest legislation -  for subsidies, tariffs, tax loopholes, or 
regulations that limit entry and competition. It can shift the distribution of in­
come in its favor by selling less and charging more for it -  that is, by collu­
sion or cartelization.
In general, special-interest legislation and monopolistic combination makes 
an economy less productive than it would have been, and the constituents of an 
organization for collective action will share the losses. But an organization for 
collective action that represents only a narrow segment of the society will bear 
only a minuscule share of these losses. A special-interest organization whose 
constituents earn 1 % of the national income will, on average, bear only 1 % of 
the loss in national output that occurs because of the inefficiency its activities 
bring about. But the special interest obtains the whole of the amount redis­
tributed to it. Thus it pays our hypothetical special-interest group to seek to 
redistribute income to its own members even if this redistribution reduces the 
national income by up to 100 times the amount redistributed.
Therefore, organizations that represent only a minute percentage of an 




























































































coalitions whose purpose is to redistribute more of society’s income to them­
selves.
If an organization for collective action encompasses a large part of the 
income-earning capacity of a country, its incentives are very different. This is 
immediately evident if one considers an organization that represents, say, half 
of the income-earning capacity of a society; its clients will on average obtain 
one-half of any increase in the national income that it brings about and bear 
half of the social loss that results from redistributions to itself There have been 
such encompassing interest organizations in Austria, Norway, and Sweden, and 
to a lesser extent in Germany and Japan.
The concept of an encompassing interest applies to many different types of 
situations, offices, and individuals. A dictator has an encompassing interest in 
any domain which he securely controls: his tax receipts, which will increase 
with the productivity of his country, give him this encompassing interest5. 
Though a large organization cannot usually optimize as effectively as a single 
individual, a large and well-disciplined political party, such as the Conserva­
tive Party in Great Britain or the Social Democratic Party in Sweden, also has 
an encompassing interest. So does a president in strong-presidency countries 
like France and the United States; a president normally needs majority support 
to be re-elected, and a majority is an encompassing constituency.
Some of the conclusions of the present argument hinge on this concept of 
the encompassing interest, and much of the later part of this essay is devoted to 
an analysis of the dynamics of encompassing special-interest organizations.
Testable Implications of the Theory
The ideas that have just been evoked can explain the most striking 
anomalies in modern economic growth. We have seen that organizations for
5 The concept of encompassing interests has only been extended to dictatorships and ana­
lyzed in a formal way since Rise and Decline was published, e.g., in Martin C. McGuire 
and Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and the Provision of Public Goods”, De­
partment of Economics and IRIS, Univ. of Maryland, Dec., 1990, and in “The Eco­
nomics o f Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force”, 
(IRIS, Univ. of Maryland and Univ. of California, Irvine, 1994) and forthcoming, Jour­
nal of Economic Literature, and in my “Autocracy, Democracy, and Prosperity”, in Strat­
egy and Choice, edited by Richard J. Zeckhauser (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
1991), pp. 131-57 and “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development”, American Political 




























































































collective action with narrow constituencies have uniquely perverse incentives, 
and that it takes a long time before a society accumulates many organizations 
for collective action. Revolutionary upheavals, totalitarian repressions, and 
foreign occupations destroy organizations for collective action. In any brief 
interval of stability, few if any groups can overcome the difficulties of collec­
tive action. By contrast, in a long-stable society, many groups will have over­
come these obstacles. Once these organizations have worked out the selective 
incentives or agreements needed for collective action, they rarely disappear 
unless they are violently repressed. Thus only long-stable societies are thick 
with organizations for collective action.
Distributional coalitions are, if my argument is correct, uniquely harmful to 
economic efficiency and dynamism. It follows that societies that set up a good 
legal order, after a catastrophe has destroyed organizations for collective ac­
tion, will grow extraordinarily rapidly for a time. Similarly, long-stable 
societies ought to grow much less rapidly than societies that are in other 
respects comparable. Thus we can test the theory by asking whether it fits the 
facts about economic performance in different countries.
The society that has had the longest period of stability and immunity from 
invasion and institutional destruction is Great Britain. As the theory predicts, 
Great Britain has also had the “British disease” -  the poorest economic per­
formance, for most of the postwar period, of the major developed democra­
cies. The economic miracles of Germany and Japan after World War II are 
also consistent with the argument. In Italy, the institutional destruction in 
World War II, while considerable, was less complete than in Germany and 
Japan. Though there definitely was an economic miracle in Italy, it was corre­
spondingly somewhat shorter and smaller than those in Germany and Japan, 
and this again is in accord with the theory. With appropriate elaboration6, the 
aforementioned theory also explains the general pattern of regional growth in 
the United States since World War II.
Consider also the most remarkable examples of economic growth in previ­
ous centuries: the growth of Germany after the Zollverein or customs union 
was established in 1834 and after German unification was completed by 1871, 
the growth of Japan after the Meiji Restoration of 1867-68, the growth of the 
United States in the 19th century, the growth of Holland during its Golden Age 
in the 17th century, the growth of Britain during the Industrial Revolution
6 See “The South Will Fall Again: The South as Leader and Laggard in Economic 




























































































from about 1760 to about 1840, and the commercial revolutions in England 
and France in the 16th century.
All of these cases illustrate what I called “jurisdictional integration”: in each 
case, a wider market was created within which there was at least internal free 
trade, and at the same time a new jurisdiction or government was established 
that could be influenced only by lobbies that were of a larger scale than most 
of those that had influenced the parochial jurisdictions that existed before.
After the creation of the much larger jurisdiction and the wider market, 
there was in every case rapid economic growth. Jurisdictional integration un­
dercut the guilds and other special-interest groups of the day. A detailed exam­
ination reveals that not only the speed of development after the jurisdictional 
integration, but also its organizational features and regional patterns are con­
sistent with the theory, as is much of the subsequent literature7.
Generalizing the Theory for Communism and the Transition
Though Rise and Decline said nothing about the Soviet-type countries, the 
theory in it was soon generalized to cover these societies and other dictator­
ships, and then later to deal with the transition from communism. Under 
Soviet-type dictatorships, there was, of course, no freedom of organization, so 
there were no formal lobbying organizations, independent labor unions, or 
other explicitly cartelistic organizations. Thus it might seem that under com­
munism there could not have been any collective action that impaired eco­
nomic performance.
7 See, for example, Kwang Choi, Theories of Economic Growth (Ames, IA„ Iowa State 
University Press, 1983); Richard Vedder and Lowell Galloway, “Rentseeking, Distribu­
tional Coalitions, Taxes, Relative Prices, and Economic Growth”, Public Choice, vol. 51 
no. 1 (1986), pp. 93-100, Steve Chan, “Growth with Equity: A Test o f Olson’s Theory 
for the Asian Pacific-Rim Countries”, Journal o f Peace Research, vol. 24, no. 2 (1987), 
pp. 135-49, Erich Weede, “Catch-Up, Distributional Coalitions and Government as De­
terminants of Growth and Decline in Industrial Democracies”, British Journal of Sociol­
ogy, vol. 37 (1986), pp. 194-220; Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, Comparative Politi­
cal Economy (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1990); Todd Sandler, Collective Action: 
Theory and Applications (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992); Jonathan 
Rauch, Demosclerosis (New York: Times Books, 1994); and many of the contributions 
in the following collections of assessments and test o f the Rise and Decline o f Nations: 
Dennis C. Mueller, ed.. The Political Economy of Growth (New Haven, Yale Univ. 
Press, 1983); International Studies Quarterly, vol. 27 (1983); Scandinavian Political 




























































































I claim that, in fact, the dictator in a Soviet-type system is utterly dependent 
tor information on bureaucratic competition among subordinates in individual 
industries and enterprises, and that the subordinates in each industry and 
enterprise can, if they covertly collude, distort the information flow going to 
the center in ways that enable them to obtain surplus resources to serve their 
own interests. Thus covert collective action ultimately creates innumerable 
nomenklatura collusions and, in the fullness of time, this devolution reaches 
the point where large enterprises and industry associations are as much insider 
lobbies and monopolies with vested interests as they are instruments of pro­
duction to serve the communist regime. Each collusion, enterprise, and indus­
try has so small a stake in the productivity of the society as a whole that each 
tends to ignore its impact on the society. In this the individual collusions and 
enterprises are very different from the General Secretary of a communist 
country, who has an encompassing interest in the productivity of his domain 
and therefore a motive to make it as productive as possible. Thus, in the 
absence of organizationally destructive events like China’s cultural revolution, 
the theory predicts that the economic performance of stable Soviet-type soci­
eties deteriorates over time. Since the enterprises and industries are not 
destroyed by the transition to democracy, but are, on the contrary, given a 
new freedom to lobby for their sectional interests, this problem is magnified 
during the transition.
Since the focus here is on Western Europe, I will not discuss the other 
testable predictions of the theory for Soviet-type and transitional societies but 
will return to developed democracies.
Better Economic Understanding as the Antidote
The theory argues that it is mainly narrow as opposed to encompassing or­
ganizations that repress economic growth. Each narrow special-interest orga­
nization represents only a tiny minority of the population. Therefore, in any 
democracy it can easily be outvoted. A special interest can get its way only 
because most of the society does not notice or understand what is happening. 
Thus Rise and Decline emphasized the quality of economic thought and the 
extent of economic literacy. It argued that, if societies came to understand and 
believe the argument in Rise and Decline, the predictions in the book would be 
refuted.
Since both the level of economic understanding and the density of organiza­




























































































mance, each needs to be kept in mind in any attempt to trace the influence of 
the other. A country may grow faster or slower than would be expected from 
its density of organization for collective action because its understanding of the 
problem -  and of what is required for an efficient and dynamic economy -  is 
better or worse than in comparable countries. It is even conceivable that so­
cieties with more serious cases -  or less opaque forms -  of institutional scle­
rosis apprehend the problem more quickly than other societies8. This means 
that we must keep both the character of collective action and the prevailing 
economic ideas in a country in mind when analyzing economic growth since 
1982.
II. Economic Growth since Rise and Decline
Some of the best evidence in support of the theory outlined above comes 
from communist and formerly communist countries. In the early postwar pe­
riod the communist countries grew relatively rapidly. But as time went on 
they suffered a gradual and continuing deterioration in their growth rates, in 
spite of their continued opportunities for fast catch-up growth. It was only 
after a long period of relative decline that communism collapsed.
The sharply contrasting consequences of the defeat of fascist and communist 
regimes fits the theory especially nicely. Whereas the defeat of fascism 
destroyed most organizations for collective action, the defeat of communism 
gave the lobbies of large enterprises and industry associations the opportunity 
to use their political muscle openly. The defeat of fascism was followed by 
economic miracles in all of the formerly Axis countries, but the defeat of 
communism has so far often been followed by even poorer performance than 
under communism. The only communist or once-communist country that has 
enjoyed an economic miracle is the one that suffered the cultural revolution 
(and after this revolution China was ruled by a pragmatic dictator with an 
encompassing interest in a productive domain). This is indeed the exception 
that proves the rule. But the focus here is on the West, so I turn to the less 
dramatic changes that have occurred in the developed democracies.
8 This possibility, and the role of economic ideas generally, is discussed in “How Ideas 
Affect Societies: Is Britain the Wave of the Future?” in Ideas Interests and Consequences, 





























































































A most interesting pattern of gradual change through time has been evident 
in the countries whose fascist regimes were defeated in World War II. The 
logic of the argument in Rise and Decline implied that the same accumulation 
of organizations for collective action that had troubled the long-stable 
English-speaking countries would also occur, if these countries remained 
stable, in Germany and Japan as time went on. This prediction was made 
explicitly:
“The theory here predicts that with continued stability the Germans and 
Japanese will accumulate mare distributional coalitions, which will have an 
adverse influence on their growth rates”9. The same argument was made sepa­
rately with respect to Italy. When Rise and Decline was being written, Ger­
many and Italy were already experiencing some reduction in relative growth 
rates, but at that time this relative decline had not attracted much attention 
outside of those countries. The almost universal forecast at that time was that 
the Japanese economic miracle would continue.
By now it is beyond dispute that the Japanese as well as the German and 
Italian economic miracles are over. In the 1950’s and 60’s, real per-capita 
incomes in Germany and Japan grew more than three times as fast as those of 
the UK, the US, Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand. Since 1980 the average 
rate of growth of per-capita income in the English-speaking OECD countries 
has been as great, and often even greater, than that of Germany and Japan.
Rise and Decline also argued that there was some institutional destruction in 
the continental countries that were under Axis occupation during World War 
II, and that many distributional coalitions in France and in some of the other 
previously protectionist countries were rendered ineffective by jurisdictional 
integration as the initial six countries created the Common Market. The juris­
dictional integration due to the formation of the Common Market gave the six 
original members some growth advantage, for a period of time, over the 
long-stable English-speaking OECD countries. Again, the theory in Rise and 
Decline predicted that with continued stability in the Common Market coun­
tries, the growth-enhancing effects of the jurisdictional effects would gradu­
ally wear off as new patterns of collective action accumulated.
Again, this is what seems to have happened. In the 1960’s per-capita 
incomes in France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands all grew at more than 
4% per year, whereas the English-speaking OECD countries grew at far




























































































slower rates. Since 1980, by contrast, these countries have grown no faster -  
and sometimes slower -  than the English-speaking OECD countries.
Countries with the most encompassing interest organizations also have 
slowed down over time. In the 1950’s and 60’s Sweden, in spite of its already 
relatively high level of per-capita income, grew faster than the 
English-speaking countries. The growth rates of Austria, Norway, and (as we 
already know) West Germany were also well ahead of those of the 
English-speaking countries. In the 1980’s (and especially the 1990’s) Swedish 
economic growth has fallen far behind that of the English-speaking countries, 
and that is also true of most of the other European countries that had enjoyed 
relatively encompassing interest group structures.
Whether we look at the growth rates of the communist countries, or at 
Germany, Japan, and Italy, or at the continental countries that were occupied 
by the Nazis in World War II, or at countries like Sweden that have had en­
compassing interest-group structures, we see that the changes are not only in 
the direction predicted by the theory, but also have the gradual character that 
would be expected from a sclerotic institutional accumulation.
Nonetheless, even though the aggregate evidence on national growth rates 
that has emerged since 1982 is certainly supportive of the theory, this aggre­
gate evidence by itself is by no means compelling. As we know, economic 
growth is influenced by many different factors. It is obviously possible that 
other factors that influence growth rates could have explained the observed 
pattern so that the conformity with the theory in Rise and Decline is spurious.
There is also another and more intriguing possibility. We recall that, if the 
theory in Rise and Decline were generally understood and accepted, the pre­
dictions of theory would necessarily be refuted, and, more generally, that the 
intellectual climate influences choices about economic policy and is therefore 
extremely important. It is possible that the countries that suffered the most (or 
suffered in the least opaque ways) from special-interest cartelization and lob­
bying would be more susceptible to analyses of the problem, and come to have 
a bit more of an apprehension of it, than societies that had-suffered less (or in 
ways that were harder to understand). At least if the issue is explicitly dis­
cussed, the degree of understanding of the damage done by distributional 
coalitions could be, at least to some extent, endogenous.
Rise and Decline pointed out that two countries that had suffered extraordi­




























































































stability but also because of their small size and then-exceptional propensities 
to industrial protectionism (the opposite of jurisdictional integration) - were 
Australia and (especially) New Zealand. Interestingly, labor governments in 
both New Zealand and Australia have undertaken widespread market-opening 
and deregulatory reforms that seem greatly to have weakened special-interest 
organizations on the business side. As might be expected, these labor parties, 
dependent in part on support from labor unions, have not taken the same 
strong stand against cartelization in the labor force. Similarly, the deregulation 
of the thoroughly cartelized and lobby-intensive industries such as airlines, 
trucking, telephones, and railroads in the United States, mainly during the 
President Carter’s Democratic administration, owed something to the conspic­
uous economic irrationalities that special-interest pressures had brought to 
these industries.
The beginnings, during the Callaghan Labour government in the United 
Kingdom, of a reliance on limiting the money supply rather than only on in­
comes policies to restrict inflation, could be interpreted in a similar way. De­
spair, even in the Bridsh Labour party, about Britain’s anything-but- encom­
passing trade unions also led a substantial part of the Labour leadership to 
leave that party to create a new political party. This step -  which was all the 
more extraordinary because the British electoral system makes the defeat of 
any third party almost inevitable -  could also be analyzed as a response to the 
severity of institutional sclerosis in Britain. As we know, the phenomenon 
there has been prolonged and serious enough to come to be called the British 
disease, and this surely generated demand for cures, even if they should be 
painful.
Thus, in the same way, Thatcherism can also be taken to be endogenous -  
even as the mirror image of the labor or left-inspired reforms in New Zealand 
and Australia. Just as the reforms inaugurated by the labor governments of the 
South Pacific focused disproportionately on reversing the losses arising from 
cartelization and lobbying by business, naturally the Thatcher government 
focused on limiting the harm done by the special-interest groups that were 
linked with the left: the labor unions, which are also the most visible part of 
the special-interest iceberg.
Intriguing as the foregoing possibility of endogenous response to institu­
tional sclerosis is, I must emphasize that I have not been able to undertake the 
multicountry study of political, economic, and intellectual history that would 
be needed to know how much truth it contains. The more important point for 




























































































be correct, including any such explanation drawn from the theory that I have 
offered. A series of factors that are not accounted for by the theory in Rise 
and Decline could have made the observed pattern of growth rates since 1982 
spuriously consistent with the theory. Some of these other factors could even 
have operated in such a way as to generate the gradual character of the ob­
served changes.
There is some addiuonal evidence in the economic literature on continental 
and Nordic Europe in the 1980’s and 1990’s. In a series of papers and lectures 
starting in 1976, and in Rise and Decline, I used the phrases “institutional scle­
rosis” and “institutional arthritis” to label the process that my theory pre­
dicted10. Thus there is perhaps a little support for my argument in the emer­
gence, in continental Europe in the 1980’s, of the term “Eurosclerosis”, which 
I have borrowed for the title of the present paper. The German economist 
Herbert Giersch appears to have coined the term, which also has currency in 
the popular press, and Assar Lindbeck gave sustained attention to the increas­
ing sclerosis in continental and Nordic Europe in 198211. In Sweden, Stahl and 
Wickman have used the more targeted label of “Suedosclerosis” in the title of a 
recent book, and this coinage also appears to be spreading12. Though the 
economists who use the sclerotic analogy have somewhat different emphases, 
the varied accounts nonetheless resonate with each other and with the argu­
ment here. Many expert observers with detailed knowledge of the economies 
of Germany, Sweden, and continental Europe find an increasing economic in­
flexibility and accumulating irrationalities in economic policy. There were few 
if any comparable complaints on the continent in the early postwar period -
10 In ‘T he Political Economy of Comparative Growth Rates”, in US Economic Growth, 
vol. 2, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Hearings of the Joint 
Economic Committee for November 10, 1976, pp. 105-112; and “Comment”, in The 
Market and the State: Essays in Honour of Adam Smith, eds. Thomas Wilson and 
Andrew Skinner (Oxford Univ. Press, 1976), 105-112. There was an international con­
ference in December, 1978, at the University of Maryland to assess and criticize an early 
draft of Rise and Decline. Though that 1978 draft and some of the papers o f commentary 
presented at that conference were circulated widely, the proceedings of this conference 
were published only later in Dennis Mueller, ed., The Political Economy of Growth (Yale 
U. Press, 1983). My use of the term “institutional sclerosis” in the 1978 paper is on 
pages 35 & 46-49 of that book, and other participants in the conference, such as K. Choi 
(pp. 57-78), J.-C. Asselain and C. Morrisson (p. 158) and D. Mueller (p. 268) also used 
the term to label my argument.
11 Herbert Giersch, “Gegen Euro-Sklerose”, Die Wirtschaftswoche, 33 (August 12, 1983), 
and “Eurosclerosis”, Institut fur Weltwirtschaft Discussion Paper #  112 (1985). See also 
the Financial Times (Sept. 11, 1984) and Time (January 30, 1984). Lindbeck’s essay is 
‘The Emerging Sclerosis in the Western Economies” (Institute for International Eco­
nomics, University o f Stockholm, 1982).




























































































there is apparently a widely observed accumulation of distortions with social 
aging.
III. Distinctive Institutions and Common Processes
Those who are skeptical about whether there are any general principles 
governing economic growth in countries with very different institutions and 
histories will want to question whether the general model in Rise and Decline 
and its collateral works can be reconciled with the great institutional and his­
torical differences across countries. Thus I face the challenge of showing how 
the general theory could be true, given the significance that idiosyncratic char­
acteristics of each country can have for economic growth.
But this challenge is also an opportunity. The institutional and historical dif­
ferences across countries can also be used to test, in a different way, whether 
the argument in Rise and Decline fits the facts of experience. If we agree about 
the important special institutional and historical features of a country, and if it 
is also clear how the general theory, if true, should be manifest in a country 
with those special institutional or historical characteristics, then we can test to 
see if exactly this manifestation is in fact observed. If the general principle 
shows up in a theoretically predicted way in each diverse institutional and his­
torical setting, then that provides additional evidence that the principle is true. 
Just as we know that a fluid is water when we know the temperatures at which 
it freezes and turns to steam, so we can have more confidence in a theory if 
the sclerotic processes vary across countries in a way that is consistent with 
that theory.
In testing the argument in this way, it will be convenient to distinguish dif­
ferent classes of cases. Some of these classes have been analyzed elsewhere and 
will only be mentioned here. Another class of cases is sufficiently straightfor­
ward that it can be evoked in a couple of paragraphs. A final class, the Nordic- 
Teutonic class, is more complex and will require a more elaborate analysis. 
Most of the rest of this paper will be devoted to dealing with this last type of 






























































































The sclerotic process that manifested itself in the developed 
English-speaking countries has already been analyzed in Rise and Decline, so it 
is now only necessary to give it a separate name. It can conveniently be called 
the “Anglo-American” or (since it covers the developed democracies that were 
once part of the British Empire) the “English-speaking” form. The way in 
which hyper-pluralistic organizational structures and collusional patterns 
evolve in the Anglo-American type of context has also been described else­
where, and thus can readily be compared with the other patterns of evolution 
that will be referred to or described in the rest of this essay.
2. Mercantilists
Most of the countries of the Third World constitute another class of cases. 
The less developed countries have poor transportation and communication 
systems that, in combination with the difficulties of collective action, normally 
make organization of rural interests impossible. Their governments tend to be 
influenced disproportionately by organized small-group interests in the major 
urban areas and especially in the capital city. These organized interests gain 
from protection and subsidies to activities in which most of the Third World 
countries do not have a comparative advantage. Because of this, they suffer 
from what I call a “perverse policy syndrome”. Since I have dealt with this 
class of cases in Rise and Decline and in some articles13. I will say no more 
about it here. Since Adam Smith first dealt with this class of cases (in analysis 
of pre-industrial Europe in the Wealth of Nations) and diagnosed it in a simi­
lar way, let us use his term, “mercantilism” to label this form of sclerosis.
3. Red Devolution
This form of institutional sclerosis has also been dealt with elsewhere14. 
The types of special-interest collusion that the theory predicts will emerge in 
societies without freedom of organization and with a Soviet-style economic 
organization are, of course, dramatically different from those that are pre­
13 “The Exploitation and Subsidization of Agriculture in Developing and Developed Coun­
tries”, op. cit. and “Space, Agriculture, and Organization”, American Journal o f Agricul­
tural Economics, Vol. 67, No. 5, December 1985, pp. 928-937
14 Peter Murrell and Mancur Olson, “The Devolution of Centrally-Planned Economies”, 




























































































dieted to emerge in developed democracies with market economies. Most of 
the specific features that the theory predicts will characterize the evolution of 
Soviet-type societies also differ from those that characterize the sclerotic pro­
cess in democracies with market economies. Because the Soviet-type societies 
lack various countervailing and corrective forces that characterize the market 
democracies, they develop a more severe sclerosis than western societies do.
4. Healing-of-Divisions Sclerosis: southern Europe
Societies differ in the degree to which they are divided over fundamental 
beliefs. Though there are divisions about government policy in all societies, in 
some there are also intense disagreements about what fundamental principles 
should govern the organization of society. The dangers and disadvantages for a 
society of intense divisions about fundamental issues are well known. Societies 
that are deeply divided are less stable and this instability not only directly en­
dangers these societies, but also generates uncertainties that reduce business 
confidence and especially limit the inflow of foreign investment.
What is not so widely understood is that social divisions can also favor eco­
nomic growth by inhibiting some collective action that reduces social effi­
ciency and dynamism. If collective action is to occur, there must be some limit 
to the intensity of divisions among those who would engage in collective 
action. Collective action by definition requires cooperation and concerted 
effort. Normally cartelization and collusion to fix prices and wages can occur 
only if everyone in some industry, craft, or occupation is willing to go along 
with it. A cartel cannot monopolize the supply of any type of good or labor if 
any suppliers who can supply a large part of total demand refuse to cooperate. 
This is one of the reasons why organizations for collective action prefer to 
have a socially homogeneous membership.
By and large, the most seriously divided societies in Europe in the early 
postwar years were the societies that had simultaneously large numbers of 
Roman Catholics and large Communist Parties: the Mediterranean societies, 
especially Italy and France. No doubt these societies suffered some loss of 
foreign investment and some capital flight and other problems because of the 
uncertainty and tension arising from their social divisions.
In general, the social divisions in these societies did not prevent collusion or 
cartelization among large private firms, since almost all of those who owned 




























































































munists were never in the central government, the state-owned firms also were 
not under communist management (though in Italy apparently there were sys­
tematic disagreements at a more encompassing level about some matters 
between the often left-Catholic managed government-owned firms in 
INTERSIND and the privately owned firms in CONFINDUSTRIA)15. So gen­
erally, the southern European societies had many powerful trade associations, 
cartels, and oligopolistic collusions, especially in the years before the Common 
Market.
The social divisions did, however, work against effective cartelization of the 
labor force in the early postwar years. There were separate communist, 
Catholic, and socialist unions, and these unions were often in conflict not only 
in the society at large, but also in particular industries, crafts, and enterprises. 
These divisions made it much more difficult for unions to obtain the powerful 
selective incentives needed to build up stable dues-paying memberships and 
large strike funds -  that is, they worked against closed shops and other forms 
of compulsory membership. Union dues and union density tended to be lower 
in southern Europe than in Britain, Scandinavia, or Germany. (Interestingly, 
as the present argument would predict, the religious-ethnic division in North­
ern Ireland is said to have made labor unions at times less strong there than in 
other parts of the United Kingdom.) The competing unions in each workplace 
also sometimes negated each other. The social divisions, and each group’s fear 
of being permanently repressed, worked against the solidarity needed for 
strikes that could outlast employers.
The labor unions in the southern European countries were able to stage con­
spicuous demonstrations, and they could often organize brief strikes, even in 
the early postwar period. They made the left-wing forces in politics more im­
portant than they would otherwise have been.
For the most part, however, the societies that were most sharply divided 
between Catholics and Communists did not have what in the United States has 
been called “business unionism”. That is, they did not have unions whose 
members shared a consensus about the acceptability of the existing social order 
and thus were able to focus single-mindedly on obtaining the strike funds and 
control over the workforce needed for effective cartelization of the supply of 
labor in some firm, craft, or industry. At the same time, the unacceptability to 
the majorities of a Communist Party in the governing coalitions (until Presi­
dent Mitterrand in France organized a coalition with the Communists that left




























































































them impotent) meant that the Communists did not have as large an effect on 
economic policy as might be expected from their numbers.
Thus there are some respects and circumstances in which, paradoxically, 
“communism is good for capitalism”. This paradox should not be overdrawn. 
The southern European societies were endangered and, in some important 
respects, damaged by their deep divisions over Communism, Catholicism, and 
what constitutional order should be chosen. Their ideological-religious divi­
sion could not have had any large impact on the cartelization of firms, and 
these societies appear to have lost a good deal from that type of cartelization. 
Still, there can be no doubt that there is an important and neglected element of 
truth in the paradox.
The foregoing argument about social divisions applies mainly to the early 
postwar period in France and Italy. The divisions over the constitution of 
society in southern Europe had diminished greatly even before the collapse of 
communism. With the collapse of the Soviet-type societies, both communism 
and fear of communism have nearly disappeared.
The logic of the theory leads one to expect certain special features in the 
sclerotic process in postwar southern Europe. Cartelization of labor markets 
would be expected to proceed more slowly than it would otherwise have done. 
The political focus of labor unions would be relatively larger and the cartelis- 
tic element somewhat smaller than in societies of lesser social divisions.
The healing of divisions would make the devolution of these societies 
resemble the English-language and north European societies more as time goes 
on. As social divisions heal, these societies would reap a direct gain from im­
proved confidence in the investment climate.
They would also lose from an increasing institutional sclerosis.
In short, the aging process in southern Europe would, by the logic of the 
argument, tend to be accompanied by a healing of social divisions that would 
bring diverse social benefits at the same time that it brings new types of dam­




























































































5. Devolution of Encompassing Interest Groups: northern Europe
As we recall, the basic logic in Rise and Decline implies that, if an orga­
nized interest is sufficiently encompassing, it will not have an incentive to en­
gage in anti-social behavior that a narrow special-interest group has. A disci­
plined labor union or employers’ association that represents, say, 50% of the 
income-earning capacity of a country, will bear on average half of any losses 
it imposes on society. Thus it will cease any redistribution to itself when the 
marginal social losses that result from this redistribution are twice as large as 
its gain at the margin from the redistribution. It will have no incentive to en­
gage in the extremely anti-social redistributions that are advantageous for a 
group that represents only a narrow interest such as an industry or occupation. 
Indeed, it has been proven elsewhere16 that if an interest is sufficiently en­
compassing -  if it is a “super-encompassing” interest -  then self-interest, para­
doxically, keeps it from taking any redistribution whatever from the rest of 
society, and motivates it to provide socially optimal supplies of public goods.
In a few (mostly small and homogeneous) societies, encompassing interest 
organizations were created by quasi-constitutional settlements utilizing, among 
other things, the power of government (or of occupation authorities). In 
Sweden, the encompassing arrangements were worked out before World War 
II and (since Sweden was not occupied or even a combatant in the war) contin­
ued unbroken through the war. In the case of Norway, Austria, and Germany, 
these arrangements date from after the war. At the beginning, in the cases of 
Norway and Sweden, and certainly of Austria, it was at most a moderate exag­
geration to say that there was only one big union that represented all manual 
workers and only one big employers’ organization representing all substantial 
firms. This was never true in Germany, but that country’s structure of labor 
unions and business organizations was nonetheless relatively encompassing, 
especially by the standards of the English-speaking countries.
As the foregoing logic would suggest, the countries with encompassing 
interest organizations worked very well in the 1950’s and 1960’s. But as time 
has gone on, their economic performance has deteriorated considerably and, in 
the case of Sweden, dramatically.
This raises the question: How do societies with encompassing interest orga­
nizations change over time? When I was writing Rise and Decline, I had no
16 In Martin C. McGuire and Mancur Olson, Jr., ‘The Economics o f Autocracy and Major­
ity Rule: The Hidden Hand and the Use of Force”, (IRIS, Univ. o f Maryland and Univ. 




























































































idea what governed the evolution of such organizations, so that book is cau­
tious and agnostic about how such organizations would work out in the long 
run. But, as I realized when writing some later articles on this subject17, the 
logic of the matter is so clear that I ought to have seen it from the start.
Though encompassing political parties and offices in certain types of elec­
toral systems can remain encompassing for indefinitely long periods, encom­
passing interest organizations, such as business organizations and labor unions, 
are eventually bound to devolve implicitly or explicitly into narrow special- 
interest groups.
The underlying logic can best be understood by comparing the incentives 
that face political parties in countries with electoral rules that generate 
two-party systems with the incentives facing organized groups in some other 
situations. In elections such as those for the House of Commons in the United 
Kingdom or in presidential elections in France or the United States, the candi­
date with a plurality -  the “first past the post” -  wins. There is no reward for 
the party that represents a block of voters but never comes in first. Therefore, 
though small parties can thrive under proportional representation, there is no 
incentive under winner-take-all electoral rules to set up political parties to 
serve the interests of the firms in any one industry, or the workers in any one 
occupation, or any other group too small to have a chance of coming in first. 
As has long been known from Duverger’s Law, in such electoral systems there 
is a tendency toward a two-party system. Thus encompassing political parties 
in countries with plurality-winner electoral systems can last indefinitely.
The situation over the long-run is dramatically different for encompassing 
interest organizations such as employers’ associations or labor unions. Lobby­
ing and cartelistic organizations do not need a majority or even a plurality of 
the society to profit from collective action. All a collusion or cartel needs is 
control over the supply in a single market. All a lobby needs is enough 
resources to hire a lobbyist, or to make campaign contributions, or to provide 
enough campaign workers to make a difference in crucial districts, and so on. 
A trade association of firms in a particular industry or the union that repre­
sents the workers in a single craft or industry will normally be large enough 
to have significant lobbying power, even if the members of the organization in 
the aggregate obtain only a minute share of the national income. They are
17 “a  Theory of the Incentives Facing Political Organizations: Neo-Corporatism and the 
Hegemonic State”, International Political Science Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, April 1986, pp. 
165-189 and “An Appreciation of the Tests and Criticisms”, Scandinavian Political Stud­




























































































therefore in a very different situation from a political party in a country with 
electoral rules that favor a two-party system.
To understand the decisive significance of this for the evolution of encom­
passing organizations, we begin by assuming an ideally encompassing system 
with one encompassing labor union representing all workers and one encom­
passing organization representing all of business.
A union representing all workers in the country, if it acts in the best inter­
ests of its clientele, strives in the labor market to obtain the highest possible 
real wages for workers as a whole. The highest possible incomes for workers 
in this society will be attainable only if the economy is efficient, which it will 
not be if workers in particular occupations have monopolistic wage levels. 
Thus an encompassing labor union representing all workers would work for 
uniform wage levels for each skill level throughout the economy.
An encompassing union will often maximize the real incomes of its con­
stituency by using its political power to obtain some income redistribution 
through government to the income categories in which its membership mainly 
falls. But it cannot serve its membership by seeking special protection or sub­
sidies for workers in particular industries or occupations: industry-specific 
and occupation-specific favoritism will reduce the efficiency and dynamism of 
an economy.
In the same way, an encompassing business organization will best serve its 
clients by opposing any industry-specific or firm-specific protection or subsi­
dies, unless they repair specific market failures, and it will also resist any 
efforts to block entry into any industries, including especially those that have 
come to have unexpectedly high profits.
Consider now an individual industry or occupation in the domain of an 
encompassing business organization or labor union. Even if the encompassing 
entity represents business as a whole or labor as whole perfectly, an individual 
industry or occupation will obtain additional gains if it wins special-interest 
legislation or a monopoly price or wage for itself. Though special-interest 
legislation and cartelistic prices or wages for an industry or occupation are 
contrary to the interests of the encompassing constituency as a whole, they are 
still advantageous for a narrow interest within it. Remember that, so long as 
an industry or occupation earns only a tiny percentage of aggregate income, it 
will bear only a tiny share of the social losses from the distortions brought 




























































































Thus, no matter how well an encompassing organization serves the encom­
passing constituency in which a given industry or occupation falls, industry- 
specific or occupation-specific lobbying or cartelization can obtain something 
extra.
Since the amount that an encompassing interest group will redistribute to its 
members is, as we found earlier, limited by its encompassing interest, whereas 
there is almost no limit to the amount of redistribution that is advantageous for 
a narrow interest, the activities of the narrow interest will normally be worth 
much more to its beneficiaries than the activities of an encompassing organi­
zation. Paradoxically, this is true even though many if not all of the narrow 
interests would have been better off if there had been no special-interest 
favoritism or cartelization by any group ! The reason is that, when the number 
of narrow interests is large, so the narrow groups do not interact strategically, 
predation by one narrow group does not affect the likelihood of predation by 
another. Thus the unilateral action of each group takes no account of the losses 
to them all from their actions in the aggregate, so they continue with 
anti-social action even if all of them would have been better off if there had 
not been any such action.
Unexpected developments that bring large gains or losses to the firms or 
workers in a given market can often open up exceptional opportunities for 
cartelization and lobbying18. As a society with encompassing organizations 
matures, more of its firms and workers will have found themselves in excep­
18 The workers in a line of work that is enjoying a boom will gain the most if  they receive 
not only the wage premia that firms want to offer to attract additional labor, but also the 
far higher increases that come from blocking entry into the booming line of work or 
making the wage so high that there is little or no employer demand for additional work­
ers. During the oil boom, the Norwegian helicopter pilots that served the oil rigs in the 
North Sea could make themselves far better off by demanding the exceptional raises their 
employers could afford than by sticking with the policy of the encompassing labor union. 
When an unexpectedly large devaluation of the Swedish Krona once made some manu­
factured exports exceptionally profitable, the Swedish engineering union decided to 
abandon centralized wage bargaining. Clearly, the encompassing interest of workers as a 
whole is normally best served by allowing those in other sectors to move into the boom­
ing lines, thereby expanding the work force that is too small and making wages higher 
than they would otherwise be in the areas that were not so lucky. Similarly, when ad­
verse shocks reduce the demand for, say, shipbuilding labor, the workers in this industry 
have an incentive to demand subsidies for the industry in which they work. By contrast, 
workers as a whole lose when a society maintains uneconomic industries that cannot 
cover their costs without protection or other subsidies. Obviously, there are exactly paral­
lel arguments showing similar conflicts of interest between the firms in a booming or 




























































































tional circumstances where the rewards from abandoning or opposing the 
encompassing organizations are unusually great.
A political entrepreneur who promotes an organization that obtains a sur­
plus by organizing collective action for a narrow group can consume part of it 
himself or herself.
Therefore, whenever the firms or workers in an industry or occupation 
have the small numbers or access to selective incentives that make collective 
action possible, there is always an incentive to organize for collective action, 
whether or not the industry or occupation is already represented by an encom­
passing organization.
Nevertheless, it takes a long time before a society comes to have a large 
number of narrow cartelistic and lobbying organizations. Whether an encom­
passing organization already exists or not, each industry, occupation, or other 
narrow group must overcome the difficulties of collective action in order to 
organize. This process slows down the devolution of societies with encompass­
ing interest organizations.
On the other hand, the foregoing logic -  and especially the logic that shows 
that it pays narrow interests to redistribute much more than any encompassing 
organization would -  implies that the branch organizations of an encompassing 
business or labor organization have a powerful incentive to push for the inter­
ests of their own branch, even when this is very harmful to the interests of the 
membership of the encompassing organization as a whole. As subordinate units 
gain autonomy and as separate industry or occupational caucuses are formed, 
an encompassing organization will tend to become merely a clearinghouse for 
the separate interests of its subordinate parts.
It might seem that the problem of insubordinate branches and independent 
coalitions could be controlled by appropriate by-laws for the encompassing 
interest group or by government legislation that discourages independent 
action by branches or other non-encompassing organizations. Corporatist 
societies such as Fascist Italy and Franco’s Spain did that with great severity. 
In political science and sociology, there are advocates of corporatism (or, as it 
is now sometimes called, neo-corporatism), and some of them propose gov­
ernment licensing or other devices to give a monopoly to corporatist pressure 




























































































The governments of some democracies have discouraged independent asso­
ciations and favored established encompassing interest organizations in other 
ways as well, and this has delayed their devolution. But governmental edicts 
cannot permanently prevent the devolution of encompassing interest organiza­
tions, at least in democracies.
There is no way that corporatist legislation in a democracy can prevent a 
branch of an encompassing organization from pressuring the leadership of an 
encompassing organization on behalf of the branch’s narrow interest. The 
branch can always press for the right to obtain a monopoly price or wage for 
itself or lobby within the encompassing organization to make it support 
special-interest legislation for the branch. This branch advocacy is bound to 
have some effect in the long run. The way to get elected to the leadership of an 
organization is to gain the favor of influential constituents. The leaders of 
branch units are accordingly important in determining who comes to lead an 
encompassing interest organization. The leaders of branch units often have an 
incentive to insist that only those candidates for central office that agree to 
allow them to set prices or wages separately in their own market, or who 
promise to support special-interest legislation for those in this market, will 
receive the branch’s support.
Those subgroups of an encompassing organization that are not already sepa­
rately organized in branches can organize a caucus or lobby within the encom­
passing organization to pressure it to serve the sectional interest at the expense 
of the encompassing interest, if they have small numbers or if selective incen­
tives can be found. In the long run, how could a democratic society prevent 
subsets of members of an encompassing organization with a legal monopoly of 
representation from being controlled in large part by internal lobbies working 
on behalf of internal subgroups? Even if a democratic government stipulates 
that only specified organizations are allowed to petition the government, how 
in practice could it prohibit the creation of internal caucuses or organizations 
to lobby internally to change the policies of any legally established encompass­
ing lobby?
The logic that has just been discussed seems to fit some developments in the 
Nordic and Teutonic economies. Some observers of Norway and Sweden have 
emphasized developments that are completely consistent with the logic that I 
have just set out. S. Lash has published an article entitled “The End of 
Neo-Corporatism? The Breakdown of Centralized Bargaining in Sweden”19.




























































































In this article he argues, from a Marxist and sociological perspective, “that 
there is a long-term trend toward decentralization of Swedish industrial rela­
tions”. The Swedish economist Assar Lindbeck has argued (personal commu­
nication) that the actual policies of encompassing organizations in Sweden have 
apparently often been dictated by relatively small subsets of the membership 
with special interests; government bail outs of Swedish shipbuilding were not 
in the interest of Swedish labor as a whole, but the big union, the LO, presum­
ably at the behest of its constituent units in the shipbuilding industry, favored 
such subsidies. Gudmund Hernes has described, in compelling detail, a large 
number of situations in both Norway and Sweden where once-encompassing 
interest organizations have been undone by breakaway organizations, by as­
sertive sub-units, or by new organizations for collective action20.
No doubt there continue to be significant episodes of encompassing behavior 
in some interest groups in Austria, Norway, Sweden, Germany, and some 
other countries. This behavior has had no counterpart in narrow distributional 
coalitions. But, as I argued in articles published in 198621, we should expect to 
find fewer examples of encompassing interest group behavior as time goes on. 
Though some additional supporting evidence has emerged since then, it 
remains to be seen whether this prediction will be borne out in the long run.
We also need to test the foregoing argument about the devolution of encom­
passing organizations against evidence on economic performance. Economic 
growth has gradually been slowing down in all of the pertinent countries, and 
the deterioration in Swedish economic performance in the last few years has 
been especially striking.
Though this is consistent with the theory in Rise and Decline, that book ar­
gues that monocausal theories are wrong and that any complex reality is multi- 
causal; there may well be other factors that account for the apparent consis­
tency of the growth data with the theory. For example, the countries in which 
encompassing organizations have been devolving tend to have above average 
levels of egalitarian or welfare-state income redistribution. The exceptionally 
high levels of income redistribution in Sweden are especially well known, and 
in the 1950’s West Germany redistributed as high a proportion of its income 
through welfare state programs as any country in the world. Probably the 
single best-known explanation of the general deterioration in economic per­
formance in the Nordic and Teutonic economies is that it is due to the magni­
20 Acta Sociologica, vol. 34, no. 4 (1991), pp. 239-60.
2 1 “An Appreciation of the Tests and Criticisms” op. cit. and “The Incentives Facing Politi­




























































































tude of their programs for egalitarian income redistribution and their corre­
spondingly high tax rates. As we shall see, this extensive redistribution may 
not be independent of the present argument, but we must nonetheless be wary 
of the possibility that the economic slowdown is due not to the devolution of 
encompassing organizations, but to inefficiencies arising from the extensive 
egalitarian redistribudons of income in these sociedes.
Similarly, the severe depression of the Swedish economy in the last couple 
of years is almost certainly partly due to various macroeconomic mistakes and 
disequilibria that are in some degree independent of the argument offered 
here. Therefore, because so many different causal factors are involved, we 
cannot know how well the available evidence fits the theory until much more 
detailed research has been done.
The high level of egalitarian income redistribution in the countries with 
devolving encompassing interest organizations raises at least three questions. 
First, why have these countries, and especially Sweden, chosen a more egali­
tarian redistribution of income than other countries? Second, in view of the 
huge divergence between marginal private and marginal social returns arising 
from the large welfare state subsidies and taxes, why have these countries done 
as well as they have? Third, why has the Swedish economy performed worse 
than the other countries in this category?
With respect to why there has been so much income redistribution, other 
factors may be more important, but I have hypothesized that the early postwar 
success with encompassing interest organizations led to overconfidence and to 
“overshooting”22 23, especially in the case of Sweden23. The successful economic 
performance at the same time that there was a substantial level of income 
redistribution persuaded many people that very much larger levels of income 
redistribution could be undertaken with little social cost. Since the deadweight 
losses from income redistribution almost certainly rise more than linearly with 
the magnitude of the redistribution and are multiplied by the distortions from 
special interests, the overshooting tended to have much higher costs than its 
advocates expected.
On the question of why the countries in this category have managed as well 
as they have, I have argued elsewhere that “explicit income redistribution” to
22 See Assar Lindbeck, “Overshooting, Reform, and Retreat o f the Welfare State”, De 
Economist, 1994, 142, pp. 1-19.
23 This is argued in my “Devolution of the Nordic and Teutonic Economies”, American 




























































































low-income people brings about, for several neglected reasons, lower dead­
weight costs and much less retardation of innovation than the “implicit income 
redistribution” in the form of protection, regulation, and cartelization that is 
normally brought about by narrow special-interest groups24.
Therefore, in the early postwar period before their encompassing organiza­
tions had devolved much. Sweden and the other countries with encompassing 
organizations had relatively less deadweight loss from income redistribution in 
relation to other countries than might have been expected. This helps to ex­
plain why Sweden and the other Nordic and Teutonic countries worked as well 
as they did for so long.
On the third question of why Sweden is lately doing worse than the other 
countries with devolving encompassing organizations, we must remember that 
because of their participation or occupation in World War II, none of the 
other countries has any encompassing organizations with continuity from 
before World War II. But Sweden does -  the “Swedish Model” or “Middle 
Way” has enjoyed continuity (and great international visibility) since the 
1930’s. Thus the country in which the devolution of encompassing interest 
organizations has apparently gone on the longest is not only a country that 
seems to have started overshooting with the welfare state relatively early, but 
also the country where this devolution has brought about the greatest deterio­
ration in economic performance.
Different Beginnings, Similar Endings
When one puts the devolution of encompassing interest-group organizations 
in perspective, the parallel with the Anglo-American or English-speaking scle­
rotic processes becomes clear. Just as political entrepreneurs have an incentive 
to organize narrow organizations for collective action in a society without any 
such organizations, so they have an incentive to create such organizations -  or 
to establish them by breaking off from larger organizations -  in a system of 
encompassing organizations. In both situations, the political entrepreneurs 
must overcome the great difficulties of collective action, so they will not be 
able to create many organizations for collective action quickly. But some 
groups have the small numbers or access to selective incentives needed for or­
ganization and will eventually succeed in organizing in a stable society. When
24 This and other arguments that bear on the present problem are set out in my book on 
How Bright Are the Northern Lights? Some Questions about Sweden (Lund, Sweden: 




























































































the firms or workers in some industry or occupation are separately organized, 
either by the creation of a new organization or by breaking away from an en­
compassing organization, they have an incentive to use cartelistic and lobbying 
power to shift the distribution of income to their advantage, and to do this 
even if the deadweight costs to society are large in relation to the amount they 
gain. This is true no matter how well the unorganized society or the 
society-with-encompassing-organizations works. So the political entrepre­
neur’s incentive to establish narrow coalitions for collective action is the same 
in both unorganized societies and in those starting with ideal encompassing 
organizations.
Though I did not realize this when I wrote Rise and Decline, encompassing 
organizations may delay -  but they cannot by themselves prevent -  the emer­
gence of narrow special interests.
The result in the long run, if we abstract from any differences across soci­
eties in how well they understand the problem, is likely to be much the same 
whether societies set up encompassing organizations or not.
In 1970 Sweden was substantially ahead of Britain, for example, in 
per-capita income, even though it started modern economic growth much later 
and had acquired a similarly high level of organization for collective action. 
Sweden’s superior performance surely owed something to the fact that its 
organizations for collective action were encompassing rather than narrow. But 
there is no reason whatever to suppose that the societies that have had highly 
encompassing organizations will stay in front. On the contrary, unless they 
acquire a better appreciation of the problem than other countries, they seem 
destined to operate more like societies with narrow organizations for collec­
tive action as time goes on.
IV. Distinctive Institutions and Inescapable Logic
If the foregoing analyses of “healing-of-divisions sclerosis” and of the 
“devolution of encompassing interest organizations” is read along with other 
publications on the sclerotic processes in Soviet-type societies, on Third World 
mercantilistic environments, and on the sclerotic process in the 
English-language countries, it becomes clear that, important as the differences 




























































































the sclerotic process are nonetheless more fundamental. Encompassing organi­
zations and social divisions are conspicuous, but the inconspicuous accumula­
tion of industry-by-industry and occupation-by-occupation lobbying and col­
lusion is likely to be more telling in the long run. The healing of social divi­
sions and the devolution of encompassing organizations tends to make the con­
tinental European societies resemble the English-speaking countries more as 
time goes on.
Important as the institutional and historical differences across societies are, 
they cannot alter the laws of logic. The logical principle that organized inter­
ests have incentives to act in anti-social ways, when they have only a narrow 
or minuscule stake in society and the capacity to influence or control coercive 
power, but incentives to act in less harmful and sometimes even socially 
beneficent ways when they have a sufficiently encompassing stake, applies to 
all societies.
So does the logic of collective action: it is only small groups and those with 
access to selective incentives that can organize for collective action in any so­
ciety. Thus groups like consumers, taxpayers, and the poor are not organized 
in any society, but in all societies more of the groups with the potential for 
collective action organize as time goes on.
The two logical principles on which the present theory is based are manifest 
in different forms in different types of societies, but they are always (along 
with other important factors in this complex and multicausal world) evident. 
The diverse manifestations of the theory in different types of societies indicate 
that the theory has not only parsimony and explanatory power, but also what 
the 19th century scientist William Whewall called “consilience”: the capacity to 
explain quite diverse phenomena.
The foregoing analysis shows that, though a society cannot preserve an 
encompassing interest-group structure over the very long run, encompassing 
political parties can be viable indefinitely with the right electoral rules. Thus 
the logic of encompassing interests argues for electoral rules that discourage 
small political parties and, ideally, even promote two-party systems. In the 
United States, where the problem is the weakness of political parties rather 
than their number, institutional rules are needed that make the political parties 
stronger and more responsible.
The most important implication of the analysis, however, is that the only 




























































































and of the present argument. The problem, even in the societies that once had 
only encompassing interest organizations, is small organized minorities. Each 
of these tiny minorities will easily be defeated if the public wises up.
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